The Perceptual Basis of Demonstrative Reference

In order to demonstratively refer to an object, we must perceive it. That much is clear on the philosophy of perception and language; but how does perception explain the intentionality of thought? Philosophical tradition, drawing on confusing notions like ''modes of presentation'' and ''conscious attention'', has internalized and over- intellectualized the relations we have with the material objects we perceive and think about, making the task of naturalizing the semantic relation of reference much more difficult than it already is. Drawing on current research in contemporary vision science, Carvalho argues that what explains the fundamental point of contact between mind and world is a form of nonconceptual access to objects described only in terms of natural principles that guide the workings of our perceptual systems. This will form the basis of a new way of looking at modes of presentation ¿ neither as entities that compose the contents of our thoughts nor as ¿ways of thinking¿ of objects, but merely as natural sensory mechanisms, through which we can explain the perceptual determination of demonstrative reference.