Managing Constitutional Crises in Africa

Since the turning point of the 1997 Harare Declaration and the two Algiers decisions of 1999, a doctrine of aversion and "zero tolerance" for unconstitutional changes of government has gradually been forged in the rhetoric of African international law. The normative framework and the organic machinery have helped the pan-African organisation to emerge from the lethargy in which it was immersed at the dawn of independence, and indeed to react whenever unconstitutional changes of government occurred both at the continental level and in African regional orders. However, the African architecture tailored to deal with unconstitutional changes of government, innovative as it is, is not without contradiction. While it appears solid and unshakeable, it has proven to be fragile and ready to collapse at the first sign of trouble. Instead of a firm normativity on the rejection of unconstitutional changes of government, political, geopolitical and geostrategic factors have infested the practice of African organizations.