Why Go Nuclear?

This book opens the "black box" of nuclear politics and offers a multivariate explanation for the decisions of Israel and India to build nuclear weapons and their choice of nuclear strategy. It sheds light on the anomalies in the nuclear decisions of both countries that are not adequately addressed by the security model and its accompanying principles of state rationality. The work reveals that while the nuclear decisions of both countries have been undoubtedly shaped by their strategic threat perceptions, two other variables have played an important role in their decisions to proliferate : the normative perceptions of their chief nuclear decision-makers and the pro- nuclear "push" initiated by chief bureaucrats residing over key scientific establishments. In a world of potent transnational security threats and impending nuclear crises, the specter of nuclear proliferation becomes ever more daunting. By understanding why new Third World proliferators decide to embark upon such a perilous path, policymakers and analysts are better informed as to the steps neccessary for the success of their non- proliferation efforts.