What am I?

In this book, I intend to carry out a two-way investigation into Kant¿s theory of self-knowledge. While the first part of the book will focus on Kant¿s doctrine of the empirical knowledge of the phenomenal self, the second part deals with Kant¿s theory of the pure self-consciousness or transcendental unity of apperception. In the first part I argue that Kant¿s doctrine of the empirical self-knowledge, which depends upon the parallelism between outer sense and inner sense, is infected with certain problems that may undermine that alleged parallelism, and, in turn, his supposedly unified perspective on knowledge of objects. In the second part of the book, which deals with Kant¿s concept of transcendental unity of apperception, I try to show that his doctrine of the transcendental self-consciousness, though in a better position than his doctrine of empirical apperception, has nonetheless some fatal problems that do not seem to be solvable within the context of the transcendental philosophy.