Relationship between Executive Compensation and Bank Performance

The objective of this book is to examine the relationship between executive compensation and bank performance. We study the executive pay structure of the U.S. largest 100 bank holding companies during period 2002-2009. Our data analysis describes differences between behaviour of TARP recipients and the banks that did not receive state financial help with consideration of financial crisis effect. We use econometric model to test the dependence of bank performance measures and particular elements of executive remuneration ¿ total sum, bonus, stock award and option award. The relationship is generally considered as weak, but we also find linkage between TARP recipients¿ compensation and Market Capitalisation and on the other hand non-TARP bank appeared to define compensation according to earning per share. A special attention is devoted to executive remuneration structures of TARP recipients with weakest results and their comparison with Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act and TARP standards.