Justification in criminal law

Is there not a more widespread belief in the collective consciousness than that of the inherent rigour of all law? Isn't the famous maxim dura lex, sed lex? Doesn't the popular proverb say that the inflexible person is as rigid as justice? In other words, the rule of law is antithetical to the concepts of tolerance and humanity. Justifying facts, in that they represent an exception to the mechanical application of criminal law, would seem to symbolise moderate justice, contrary to these absolutist conceptions. But what is the value and scope of these objective grounds for lack of criminal responsibility in our current penal system? What are we to make of contemporary applications of self-defence and the state of necessity? The conclusion is clear: justification, which is currently fragmented, needs a new general theory that is more objective and less restricted. As a mechanism at the crossroads of the major issues in criminal law, an interest in justification makes it possible to re-examine more broadly the legitimacy of the right to punish and the purpose of the offence.